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ANNALS, AAPSS, 467, May 1983

U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959-80:
Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba

By JOHN SCANLAN and GILBURT LOESCHER

ABSTRACT: Migration from Cuba to the United States since Castro
assumed power, and the characterization of those leaving as refugees, have
been strongly affected by U.S. foreign policy concerns. During the 1959-62
migration wave, particularly prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion,

Cubans were welcomed as temporary exiles, likely to topple Castro and
return home. The second major migration wave began in 1965, in the midst
of a U.S. campaign for systematically isolating and economically depriving
Cuba and its citizens. When thousands of those citizens left Cuba, primarily to improve their economic circumstances and rejoin family members,

they were welcomed as refugees because of the symbolic value of their
rejection of Latin America's only communist state. The third migration
wave occurred in 1980, after a decade of detente and gradually improving

U.S.-Cuban relations. It served no clear U.S. foreign policy ends and was
perceived as helping Cuba rid itself of undesirables. Consequently those
arriving received little public support.

John Scanlan and Gilburt Loescher served as consultants to the Select Commission on

Immigration and Refugee Policy and are currently working on a study of U.S. refugee
admissions policy under a Ford Foundation grant. Both are in residence at the Center of
International Studies, Princeton University.
John Scanlan is a member of the faculty of the Notre Dame Law School and assistant
director of its Centerfor Civil and Human Rights. He has written extensively on legal and
public policy matters.
Gilburt Loescher is an assistant professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He is the coeditor of Human Rights and
American Foreign Policy (1979).
NOTE: The authors wish to thank Susan Roberts for help in assembling the documentation for this

article.
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ETWEEN 1 January 1959 and 31
October 1980, over 800,000 Cubans
entered the United States. The over-

117

when the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) was first implicated in bringing
Cuban counterrevolutionaries to the Uni-

whelming majority entered outside ordinary immigration channels and were
afforded special status as de facto or
officially recognized refugees. Virginia

first pursued in July 1960, when President Eisenhower drastically reduced the

Dominguez has noted that it is impossi-

tion began when the United States, after

ted States. Economic deprivation was

Cuban sugar quota. Diplomatic isola-

ble directly to correlate particular out-

considerable provocation by Castro,

flows of particular refugees leaving Cu-

closed its embassy in Havana on 3 Janu-

ba with specific. political and economic
events occurring after Castro assumed

Castro regime ideologically began even

ary 1961. Attempts to discredit the

power.' In general terms, however, it is

before Cuba normalized its relations

possible to relate refugee-creating conditions in Cuba to U.S. policy directed

with the Soviet Union in May 1960, and
intensified after the unsuccessful Bay of

toward the Castro regime, and to relate

Pigs invasion in April 1961. Although
President Kennedy, in his exchange of

U.S. willingness to accept so many Cubans as refugees to the objectives of that
policy.
Thus after a brief period of strained

tolerance during 1959-60, U.S.-Cuban
relations have been marked by continu-

ous mutual hostility and distrust, only
partially relieved by normalization initiatives undertaken by the Ford and Carter
administrations. Resulting from this mu-

tual antagonism have been a polarization of U.S.-Cuban relations along an
East-West axis, accelerated radicalization of the Cuban state, and a series of
steps undertaken by the United States to

isolate diplomatically, deprive economically, discredit ideologically, or-prior
to 1965, at least-overthrow violently
the Castro regime.2 Violent subversion
dates back at least to the fall of 1959,
1. Virginia Dominguez, From Neighbor to
Stranger: The Dilemma of the Caribbean Peoples
in the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 21.
2. "The effort to assassinate Castro began in
1960 and continued until 1965." U.S. Congress,
Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,

Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders: An Interim Report (Washington, DC:

letters with Khruschev ending the 1962

Cuban missile crisis, disavowed any
intention of directly intervening militar-

ily in Cuba, covert CIA activities aimed
at Cuba continued, as did attempts to
pressure all Organization of American
States members to break off diplomatic

relations with Cuba and to extend the

U.S.-initiated boycott of all Cuban commerce to other countries in and outside
of the Western Hemisphere.

The politics of hostility have thus
been multifaceted, with a number of
means employed simultaneously to under-

mine the Castro regime. Nevertheless
those politics, at least to the extent that
they relate to Cuban migration, fall into
three distinct eras, each comprehending

a period of significant flow of Cubans
into the United States. During the first
two eras, the admission of Cubans into

the United States served clear foreign
policy ends. Thus the arrival of some
125,000 exiles between January 1959
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 255. Over

100 pages of the report are devoted to CIA involvement in at least eight assassination attempts
initiated during this period.
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and April 1961 was positively regarded,

Despite extensive planning and elabo-

since it seemed a temporary phenomenon

rate immigration controls regulating the
entry and final settlement of some 39,000
Hungarian refugees in 1956-57,5 no similar program was instituted for the larger

that presaged, with refugee help, the
forcible removal of Castro from office.

Similarly the airlift of some 261,000
Cubans to the United States from 1

and more concentrated Cuban flow;

December 1965 through 6 April 1973,
although accomplishing Castro's goal of
easing pressure on a beleaguered economy and explicitly designed to permit
exiles to bring family members to the
United States, also promoted the goals
of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon

although there was significant and rising

administrations to weaken the Cuban

economy further and to broadcast the

unemployment in the nation generally

and in Florida, many of the Cubans
arrived without adequate means of support, and large numbers of Cuban chil-

dren quickly overwhelmed the Florida
schools.

Specifically lacking were detailed security checks prior to admission, any require-

ideological bankruptcy of the Castro re-

ment that admittees have guaranteed

gime. The Carter administration also
made some attempts to draw political
lessons from the first stages of the

employment in the United States, enlist-

Mariel boatlift in 1980, indicating, in the

words of Vice-President Mondale, that
there "is no better proof of the failure of
Castro's revolution than the dramatic

exodus which is currently taking place."3

However, the 1980 Mariel exodus was
essentially unique in its failure to serve
any clearly enunciated and consistently

held foreign policy goals of the United
States. Instead, to the extent that it
served any nation's objectives, that nation was Cuba.
THE POLITICS OF EXILE:
1959-61

From 1 January 1959 through 31
December 1960, approximately 100,000

Cubans arrived in the United States. At

least 40,000 of them-perhaps as many
as 70,000-settled in southern Florida.4

3. White House Press Release, 27 Apr. 1980,
Bulletin of the Department of State, 80(2039):68
(June 1980).
4. All figures on Cuban migration from 1959
through 1980 are estimates, compiled from a variety of sources, including Immigration and Natu-

ment of private voluntary organizations

(PVOs) in a formalized sponsorship
program, and any plan to distribute
geographically-resettle-those entering
in communities throughout the United
States. Instead a passive admissions policy was followed having the following
characteristics:

(1) The consular office in Cuba, which

remained open until 1 January 1961,

ralization Service Annual Reports, 1960-78; Max
Azicri, "The Politics of Exile: Trends and Dynamics of Political Change among Cuban-Americans,"

Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, 11(2)/12(1)
(July 1981-Jan. 1982); U.S., Congress, Senate,
Report on the Refugee Act of 1980, Senate Report

no. 256, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980; and various
documents of the Cuban Refugee Assistance Pro-

gram, included in Carlos E. Cortes, ed., Cuban
Refugee Programs (New York: Arno Press, 1980).
5. A good account of the controls in effect in
1956-57, and their partial relaxation in response to

the Hungarian crisis, is contained in Martin A.
Bursten, Escape from Fear (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1958), pp. 51-66. For the
view that security screening should have been
more exacting, see Marion T. Bennett, American

Immigration Policies: A History (Washington,
DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp. 204-6.
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issued visas in an expedited and ap-

established political ties and geographi-

parently pro forma manner.

cal affinity. Executions and public trials
of members of the old regime occurred

(2) The Coast Guard made no attempt

to turn away undocumented Cubans

who even during this early period

were arriving quite regularly in small
boats.

(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) avoided instituting
deportation proceedings against those
arriving illegally or remaining in the
United States after the expiration of
their visas, and began the process of
granting "extended voluntary departure"

as a deportation-avoidance device.6

These liberal admissions practices7
were partly explicable on humanitarian
grounds as well as on grounds of long6. According to one source, "U.S. authorities
have taken unusual steps to facilitate the entry of
disaffected Cubans, even going so far as to allow

the majority to enter without visas. No other
potential exile group in the hemisphere has been

so advantaged. If Castro's policies created the
potential for mass exodus, U.S. policies made the
exodus possible." R.F. Fagen, R. A. Brody, and T.
J. O'Leary, Cubans in Exile: Disaffection and the
Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1968), p. 102.

7. The ad hoc responses of consular and
immigration officials were largely due to the lack
of any formal refugee definition and special admis-

sions bureaucracy applicable to arriving Cubans.
Indicative of the government's undiscriminating
approach to the Cuban migrants was the working
definition of "Cuban refugee" employed by the
Cuban Refugee Program when it became operational in February 1961. Under that definition,

any Cuban registered at the Cuban Refugee
Emergency Center in Miami who left Cuba after 1
January 1959, bearing proper identification from

the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
holding the status of parolee, permanent resident,
or student, or granted indefinite voluntary depar-

ture, was deemed a refugee. John F. Thomas,
"Cuban Refugees in the United States," International Migration Review, 1[2](1967); rpt. in Cortes,
ed., Cuban Refugee Programs.

soon after Castro assumed power.8 The
earliest arrivals were Batistianos who

had good cause to fear the same fate.
They were soon followed by other Cubans not directly implicated in the former

government. Self-imposed political exiles,

they were clearly pushed out of Cuba,
where they held positions of wealth,
privilege, and power, rather than pulled
to the difficult life that awaited them in

Miami.9 A final group arriving in the
first 28 months of Castro's rule were

some of his disaffected followers, vete-

rans of the Sierra Maestra campaign.
Like the Batistianos, they had reason to

fear for their personal safety. During
this period there were relatively few restraints against emigration, and commer-

cial flights continued to operate out of
Havana.

However, the informality of the early

U.S. response to the Cubans cannot be
explained without taking into account
the special perception of them shared by

the Eisenhower and Kennedy adminis8. Sources for the historical account that

follows include, inter alia, Hugh Thomas, Cuba:
The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper &
Row, 1971); Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and

the United States (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1971); John Barlow Martin,
U.S. Policy in the Caribbean, A Twentieth Century

Fund Essay (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978);
Dominguez, From Neighbor to Stranger; Jorge I.
Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cam-

bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978);
Lynn Darrell Bender, The Politics of Hostility
(Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University

Press, 1975); Lester A. Sobel, ed., Castro's
Cuba in the 1970's (New York: Facts on File,
1978); and New York Times Index, 1959-80.

9. Fagen, Brody, and O'Leary, Cubans in
Exile, p. 4.
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tration. That perception regarded the

until 17 March 1960."1 However, such a

Cuban flow as temporary, a view embo-

use of the exile community was officially

died in the frequent use of the word

contemplated a full year earlier, when it

"exile"10 to describe those fleeing from
Castro's Cuba prior to late 1962 or early

was urged privately by then Vice-

1963. From the very beginning, those

autumn of 1959, the CIA was not only in

settling in Florida were united by a
common goal: to return to their home-

contact with the exile community but
had helped ferry Cubans from Cuba to

land as quickly as possible. During

Florida. Such ties may in fact date from

1959, the Eisenhower administration
restrained its hostility toward Castro.

date, it is clear that President Kennedy

Nevertheless tensions between the two

President Richard Nixon.12 By the

March 1959 or earlier. Whatever the

inherited from President Eisenhower

countries intensified. The United States

not only an invasion plan, but also two

reacted negatively to a wide range of
events in Cuba, including the public

correlative beliefs: that Castro could be

trials and executions of several Ameri-

overthrown with the help of Cubans in
the United Statesl3 and that once he was

cans; land reform and nationalization

overthrown, these Cubans would-as

programs in Cuba that affected or threat-

they so often publicly proclaimed-

ened U.S. economic interests; fear of

return home. These beliefs did not neces-

communist subversion in the Caribbean;

sarily entail enlisting large numbers of
Cubans in the revolutionary brigade
training in Guatemala; but they did tend
to discourage federal policy that treated

and a developing political, economic,
and military relationship between the
Soviet Union and Cuba. Cuba was

directly threatened by the U.S. decision

to slash its sugar quota and by the
repeated incursions of counterrevolutionaries flying into Cuba from sanctuaries in southern Florida. Ever mindful
of the overthrow of the leftward-leaning

Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954
and an extensive program of CIA covert
activities throughout the Western Hem-

isphere, Castro was spurred into antiAmerican hysteria in March 1960, when

La Courbe, a French ship docked in
Havana harbor, inexplicably exploded
with considerable loss of life.

The training of exiles for a possible
future invasion of Cuba did not occur
10. "Exile" and "Cuban refugee" have been
used interchangeably from 1959 on. During the
early 1960s, however, the former term predominated in newspaper accounts and was frequently

linked-as it has been consistently since-with
attempts to overthrow the Castro regime.

the exile phenomenon as potentially
long-standing or permanent, particularly
if such policy meant removing the exiles

from their staging area for impending
return, southern Florida.

Thus on 7 December 1960, the first
organized federal response to the Cuban
influx emerged with the opening of the

Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in
Miami.14 In January 1961, President
Kennedy established a successor Cuban
11. Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom,
p. 1271.

12. Ibid., p. 1243.
13. Kennedy apparently arrived at this view
independently of the Eisenhower administration,
since prior to learning of its CIA initiatives in
Cuba, he had commenced urging the arming of
exiles in the United States as part of his presidential campaign.

14. Report to the President of the United
States on the Cuban Refugee Problem (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1;
rpt. in Cortes, ed., Cuban Refugee Programs.
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Refugee Program designed to meet the
same two fundamental objectives: provision of welfare benefits to Cubans in
need and resettlement of some of the

thousands of Cubans already straining
the resources of southern Florida to

other parts of the United States. At the

time that the Eisenhower program was
established, it was recognized by the
man who designed it, Tracy Voorhees,
that resettlement might be the more dif-

ficult process. Thus he reported to the
president that Cubans in Florida were
convinced that it would soon be possible
to return to their homeland and would

not willingly relocate in significant num-

bers unless granted "assurance from an
authoritative source... that they are not
losing their chance to return home."'5
Voorhees's concern proved to be justified. As of the end of March 1961,
13,122 Cubans out of an exile population of approximately 125,000 had registered at the Cuban Refugee Center in
Miami; only 2011 had been resettled.'6
Kennedy's decision on 11 March "to let
the Cubans go where they yearned to

go-to Cuba'17 thus fulfilled a longstanding expectation of the exile community and brought a series of political
decisions affecting that community to a

logical close. However, when the decision was implemented on 17 April 1961,
the Bay of Pigs invasion failed.

THE POLITICS OF ISOLATION
AND FLIGHT: 1961-73

The Bay of Pigs fiasco was a watershed

event in the Kennedy administration
and a key moment in the development of

U.S. policy toward Cuba and toward
the Cubans already in the United States

or seeking to enter. Nevertheless the
politics of exile, characterized by the
expectations and the implicit promise of

repatriation, did not die an immediate
death. Instead repatriation became suddenly a more distant prospect, and the
United States was forced to regard the
exile community as a fact that would not

disappear overnight. One response might
have been to close the border to Cuban

entrants, most of whom were arriving
on regularly scheduled airline flights at
the rate of 1500-1700 per week. No con-

sideration at all appears to have been
given to this alternative. Instead Cuban
migration continued at approximately
the same rate until 22 October 1962,
when in the aftermath of President

Kennedy's Cuban missle crisis speech, it

was unilaterally terminated by Castro.
In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs, it

would have been politically suicidal and
highly questionable morally to shut the

door on potential Cuban entrants.

The United States had planned,
equipped, and then, through its halfhearted support, helped to botch an

invasion that left over a hundred exiles

dead and nearly 1200 in the hands of
Castro's army. However critical the U.S.
15. Ibid., p. 10.
16. Resettlement and registration figures are
drawn from Thomas, "Cuban Refugees in the United States," p. 14, Table 2. The flow estimate is a

projection based on INS annual figures and esti-

mated rates of flow.

17. Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., A Thousand

Days: Kennedy in the White House (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 242.

press was of the planning and execution
of the Bay of Pigs, it was clear that there
was widespread support for driving communism from the Western Hemisphere

and general admiration for those abandoned on the beaches of Cuba.'8 U.S.
18. Typical of the press coverage of the time
was an editorial in the Washington Post, 18 Apr.
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perception of the exiles as victims and
opponents of an ongoing historical process did not change after the Bay of Pigs;
what changed was the perception of the
strength of that process as it manifested
itself in Cuba and the perception of the

role that Cubans who had already fledor might flee in the future-could realistically have in reversing it.
These new perceptions and the shape

of U.S. policy to come were signaled on
20 April 1961 in President Kennedy's
first public statement after the Bay of
Pigs. Entitled "The Lesson of Cuba,"19 it

made the following points. First, communism was firmly entrenched in Cuba

and would not be easily overthrown.
Second, the Cuban threat was part of a
broader hemispheric and global campaign, which relied not only on military

force, but also on the "legitimate discontent of yearning peoples."20 Third,
refugee flow reveals the bankruptcy of

communism's promise:
Those who shaped automatic "riots" in the
streets of free nations over the efforts of a

small group of young Cubans to regain their

freedom should recall the long rollcall of
refugees who cannot go back-to Hungary,
to North Korea, to North Vietnam, to East

cruel oppression now holding sway in their
homelands. "21

Fourth, in order to meet the threat of
Castro's communism, the United States,

together with other nations in Latin
America, would have to assert its own
will in "a struggle in many ways more
difficult than war":
If the self-discipline of the free cannot match

the iron discipline of the mailed fist-in economic, political, scientific, and all the other

kinds of struggles as well as the militarythen the peril to freedom will continue to
rise.22

Kennedy's speech provided the blueprint for U.S.-Cuban relations for the
next 13 years and gave a good indication

of the role that Cuban refugees would
play in the second stage of the struggle.
Significantly, it did not renounce the use
of force, although it precluded any "unilateral American intervention in the
absence of an attack on ourselves or an
ally."23 CIA intervention in Cuban affairs,

either direct or through intermediaries,

continued into the Nixon era,24 if not
beyond. Included were several attempts

to assassinate Castro commencing in
late 1961, although not made public

Germany, or to Poland, or any of the other

until 1975.25 Exiles continued to receive

lands from which a steady stream of refugees

on-the-record financing with CIA funds

pours forth, in eloquent testimony to the

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 659.
24. In addition to the assassination attempts
1960, p. 14. Entitled "Invasion of Cuba," it began,
"Most Americans will make no secret of their

(note 2), it was alleged by former Defense Department consultant Lowell Ponte that in 1969-70, the

sympathy with the efforts of Cubans to overthrow

CIA attempted to damage Cuba's sugar crop by
means of a cloud-seeding program. New York

the Communist-dominated regime of Fidel Castro." Later it asserts, "There is no law or treaty
which precludes American help to those who are
seeking to regain their freedom."

19. Speech before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, 20 Apr. 1961, Department of
State Bulletin, 44(1141):660 (8 May 1961).
20. Ibid.

Times, 27 June 1976, p. 7. In 1977, it was reported
by Newsday that "anti-Castro terrorists had introduced African swine flu into Cuba in 1971 "with at

least tacit CIA approval. Sobel, ed., Castro's Cuba
in the 1970's, p. 131.
25. See U.S. Senate Select Committee, Alleged
Assassination Plots.
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until May 1963, when it was announced
that the annual stipend to the Cuban
Revolutionary Council would be termi-

The Kennedy administration understood, as perhaps did the Eisenhower
administration before it, that political

nated.26 Circumstantial evidence suggests

and economic assaults on the Castro

that radical anti-Castro Cubans con-

regime could not be divorced from attacks

tinued to receive secret U.S. government
aid for at least another decade and that
there were ties between U.S. intelligence
agencies and the exile group that bombed

a Cuban airline in 1976, killing 73
people.27
Nevertheless after the Bay of Pigs, the

on that regime's ideological appeal. Castro's revolution promised a rapid transformation from a free market to a socialist system and an end to the poverty that

had always plagued the Latin American

peasantry. U.S. policy toward Latin
America, as enunciated in the aftermath

United States refused to support any

of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile

large-scale military enterprise or recog-

crisis, had two principal objectives: bring-

nize any Cuban government-in-exile,
and the realization slowly grew that
exile was likely to be a long, drawn-out

state, perhaps even a permanent one.
New legislation recommended by Presi-

ing about "within a democratic framework, the economic development and
social reform necessary to provide a better way of life for millions of restless,

dent Kennedy on 21 July 1961 and

underprrivileged people"30 and defending and protecting "our democratic insti-

Cuban refugee aid on a permanent

tutions against the attempts of Castro
communism to undermine and destroy

enacted on 28 June 1962 authorized

basis.28 In 1966, Congress acted to regu-

them."31

larize and make permanent the immigration status of all of the Cubans who

The Alliance for Progress, a massive
hemispheric aid program launched by

had arrived since 1 January 1959.29 The
struggle, in other words, was not likely

in office, was intended to serve as the

to be a new war of liberation, manned by

primary vehicle for the first objective. A

exile invaders. Instead, as President
Kennedy's 20 April 1961 speech intimated, it was going to be a longer cam-

President Kennedy during his first days

campaign to extend U.S. diplomatic
and commercial sanctions against Cuba

paign, waged simultaneously on diplo-

to every nation in the hemisphere, and
to Cuba's traditional trading partners in

matic, economic, and ideological fronts.
Refugees would no longer be in the van-

primary vehicle for the second.

guard, yet they would continue to play a
role.
26. New York Times, 1 May 1963, p. 11. Also
see New York Times, 17 Apr. 1963, p. 1.
27. New York Times, 20 Oct. 1976, p. 3; New
York Times, 22 Oct. 1976, p. 4; New York Times,
24 Oct. 1976, sec. IV, p. 2; New York Times, 28
Nov. 1976, p. 35; and Washington Post, 25 Oct.
1976, sec. A, p. 26.
28. Migration and Refugee Assisstance Act of
1962, 76 Stat. 121.
29. Act of 2 Nov. 1966, 80 Stat. 1161.

Europe, was intended to serve as the
Under Secretary of State George Ball
labeled this campaign a "systematic pro-

gram of economic denial" in a speech

30. Edwin A. Martin, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, "Interdepend-

ence and the Principles of Self-Determination"
(Address before the Pan-American Society of the
United States, 16 Apr. 1963), Department of State
Bulletin, 48(1245):711 (6 May 1963).
31. Ibid.
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delivered in April 1964.32 In that speech,
Ball noted that this program was intended

as the substantive complement to an
ongoing "propaganda campaign. 33 Sum-

marizing its objectives, Ball indicated

that a "program of economic denial

ing an embargo on trade with Cuba and

placing severe restrictions on travel to
and from Cuba by persons using U.S.
passports. In January 1962, the foreign
ministers of the Organization of Ameri-

[was not] likely by itself to bring down
the present Cuban regime."34 Instead it

can States (OAS) voted to exclude Cuba
from participation in the OAS system.
In 1963, President Kennedy pledged to

could accomplish other, more limited

build a "wall" around Cuba,36 and mea-

sures were taken to pressure the major

purposes:

First, to reduce the will and ability of the
present Cuban regime to export subversion
and violence to other American states;
Second, to make plain to the people of Cuba
and to elements of the power structure of the

regime that the present regime cannot serve
their interests;

industrial nations to cut all trade with
Cuba.

Finally in July 1964, after years of
U.S. pressure and the overthrow of a
government sympathetic to the Castro
regime in Brazil, and over the objections

of Chile, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico,
the OAS imposed comprehensive dip-

Third, to demonstrate to the people of the
American republics that communism has no
future in the Western Hemisphere; and

lomatic and trade sanctions. These sanc-

Fourth, to increase the cost to the Soviet

the suspension of all trade except in
foodstuffs and medicine, and the suspension of sea transportation between
Cuba and other American states except

Union of maintaining a Communist outpost
in the Western Hemisphere."35

U.S. policy toward Cuba from the
beginning of 1962 through 1974 was large-

ly devoted to spreading and defending
the gospel of economic denial. Through-

out the period, and particularly during
the airlift years, 1965-73, Cuban refugees were used both as acolytes of that

tions included the breaking of diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba,

that employed for humanitarian reasons.
Cuba was thus isolated almost entirely
from other countries in this hemisphere,
and although not cut off entirely from
other Western trade, it had its access to

gospel and as instruments of that policy.

shipping, air transportation, and markets
dramatically reduced. The results, when

The boycott of Cuba was probably
the most intensive campaign of com-

world market price of sugar, were pre-

mercial isolation ever waged by one
nation, and its allies, against another.
Overt U.S. actions included maintain-

32. George Ball, "Principles of Our Policy
toward Cuba" (Speech before a Convention of the

Omicron Delta Kappa Society, 23 Apr. 1964),
Department of State Bulletin, 50(1298):741 (11
May 1964).

combined with a dramatic decline in the

dictable. The Cuban economy, which

had remained on a fairly even keel
through 1962, plunged in 1963 and 1964
into a trough from which it was not to

emerge for nearly a decade. Between
1962 and February 1965, Cuba's trade
via free world ships declined nearly 60
36. "President Urges Wall of Liberty Encir-

33. Ibid.

cling Cuba" (Speech before Central American

34. Ibid.

President's Conference, 18 Mar. 1963), New York
Times, 19 Mar. 1963, p. 1.

35. Ibid.
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percent.37 Not surprisingly, Castro turned

policy contributed greatly to the decline

increasingly to the Eastern bloc for trade

of the Cuban economy in the middle

and aid, and Cuba became increasingly
dependent on its socialist allies.

1960s, and that the first significant migraation from Cuba since 1962 was one

While the poorest members of Cuban
society benefited from the vast expansion of schooling and medical programs,
the material and political position of the
remaining Cuban middle class deteriorated rapidly. According to the account

of one State Department official in
1964, for "the first time in their history,

the 'Cuban people must queue up to
receive meager rations of food and cloth-

ing."'38 It was hardly surprising, therefore, that considerable sentiment to leave

Cuba, particularly among the middle

class, developed in 1964 and 1965sentiment that led directly to Castro's

public statements on 28 and 30 Sep-

tember 1965 that all who desired to leave

Cuba were free to do so; to President
Johnson's welcoming response at the
Statue of Liberty on 3 October;39 and to

the negotiations leading to the com-

major result. Virginia Dominguez, in
congressional testimony, labeled the post1965 Cuban arrivals "consumer refu-

gees," explaining that they were
people who left Cuba largely because they
were used to a standard of living they could

no longer have in Cuba. Many consumer
goods were not easily available after the
revolution. Many of those who came after
1965 were housewives and children, and
were not actively political. They were not
necessarily poor, or the victims of political
persecution. The people who really do qualify as political refugees... are those who left
within the first two years after the revolution
and not those thereafter.40

Undoubtedly this generalization ignores
some individual Cubans who left Cuba

between 1965 and 1973 for explicitly
political reasons. Nonetheless it is note-

rioca harbor engineered by Castro with

worthy that the eligible pool for the
freedom flights excluded all political
prisoners, and all draft-age men, who
might have sought refuge as conscientious objectors.41 Instead the Memo-

the cooperation of the exile community

randum of Understanding between Cuba

mencement of more than seven years of

freedom flights on 1 December 1965,
after a short-lived boatlift from Cama-

in the United States.

Thus there can be no doubt that a

systematic and rigorously pursued U.S.

and the United States, in the words of
one State Department official, "was

37. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, OAS Rep-

40. Testimony of Virginia Dominguez, House

resentative, Address to the Council of the Organi-

Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigra-

zation of American States, 27 Feb. 1965, Depart-

tion, Refugees, and International Law, 24 May

ment of State Bulletin, 52(1344):465 (29 Mar.
1965).

38. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, "The Western Hemisphere's Fight for Freedom," Department of State

Bulletin, 51(1321):550 (19 Oct. 1964).
39. "Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill," 3 Oct. 1965, in Public Papers of the
Presidents: Lyndon Johnson, 1965 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1966-68), Vol.
2, pp. 1039-40.

1979, Committee Report, Hearings on the Refugee Act of 1979, House Report 2816 (Washington,
DC: Government Printing Office, 1979).

41. "Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Movement to the United States of
Cubans Wishing to Live in the United States,"
"Third Separate Note on Political Prisoners," 6
Nov. 1965; rpt. in House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Hearings: Cuba and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1970),
pp. 5-9.
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designed essentially to reunite families
in the United States."42

Although U. S. officials often took

escape routes are sealed, accommodation to
the inevitable becomes the prevailing attitude. Illustrative of this phenomenon is the

partial credit for the growing hardship

case of East Germany where the beginning of

in Cuba, such claims were always tempered by assertions, similar to the one

the erection of the Berlin wall: when the wall

made by Under Secretary of State George
Ball in 1964, that

Cuba is providing a spectacle of economic
failure for all to see. Far from offering a
better life for the Cuban people, Communism is bringing only depression and want.43

The imperatives of this ideological logic
required that those fleeing such depression and want be labeled refugees, their

departure treated as a ballot for freedom.44 Further, it was believed or at
least argued as late as 1970 that a gener-

ous U.S. refugee immigration policy
might encourage continued resistance to

economic recovery can be said to date from
barred future escape to the freedom of the

West, the East German population had no
real alternative but to accommodate to the

Communist regime there. The refugee airlift,
a route to freedom, forestalls the certainty of

accommodation to communism by the Cuban
people.45

In sum, it was an article of faith that the

ultimate repudiation of communism was

the spectacle of people "voting with
their feet." That type of vote, U.N.
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg argued
in 1965, is a "criterion of how people
really feel":46

Many thousands of Cubans have seized

communism in Cuba. Thus defending

every available means of transportation which

the continuation of the freedom flights
that had begun in December 1965, Robert

will take them from Cuba to the United

States, but no crowds are pounding on

Hurwitch, deputy assistant secretary of
state for Inter-American Affairs, testi-

Cuba's gates and seeking admission.47

fied in July 1970,

tinued, he might have noted that the

In addition to the humanitarian considera-

unidirectional flow from Cuba was per-

Had Ambassador Goldberg con-

tions involved and the fact that we have

ceived by policymakers in the United

entered into an international agreement,

States as having an instrumental as well

there is additional sound basis for the airlift.

Experience has indicated that as long as
hope for escape to freedom exists, people
living under oppression resist committing
themselves to the regime's goals; but when
42. Statement of Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

as a symbolic effect. As U.S. resistance
to a U.N. decision to grant Cuba agricultural development funds illustrated,
economic denial was linked to an attempt
to deprive Cuba of technical expertise.48
45. Hurwitch, Statement, p. 5.

Political and Economic Migration," Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, 11(2)/12(1):79-97 (July

46. Arthur Goldberg, Statement before the
General Assembly, 21 Dec. 1965, Department of
State Bulletin, 50(1387):128 (24 Jan. 1966).
47. Ibid., pp. 128-29.
48. At issue was a $1 million appropriation by
the U.N. Special Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization for an agricultural research
station in Cuba. The United States objected continually to the grant of such technical assistance

1981-Jan. 1982).

from 1961 through the spring of 1963. See Secre-

Affairs, 8 July 1970; rpt. in ibid., p. 41.

43. Ball, "Principles of Our Policy," p. 743.
44. For an excellent treatment of the symbolic

function of political migrations to the United

States, see Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, "Cubans and

Mexicans in the United States: The Functions of
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Increasingly in the late 1960s and early
1970s, Castro complained of the nega-

tive effect on the Cuban economy
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migrants rejoining family members from

Spain, and the occasional boat person.
Despite its initial characterization as a

wrought by the departure of so many
well-educated and skilled people to the
United States. Cuban unwillingness to

members by the Carter administration,

let the freedom flights continue indefi-

the 1980 influx aroused unprecedented

nitely was undoubtedly influenced by
this brain drain.49 However, in ways
apparently not foreseen by anyone in
the Department of State, some signifi-

opposition within weeks of its inception
and resulted within months in a total

cant benefits accrued to the Castro

One reason for this reversal was the

regime from the outflow. Thus potential
dissidents were exported in large numbers, their property redistributed, and
the socialization of the Cuban economy
hastened. It is thus not clear that the

1965-73 migration was of more lasting

benefit to the United States than it was

freedom flotilla by the press50 and the
initial warm welcome extended to its

reversal of two decades of unquestioning welcome of anti-Castro Cubans.
backlash generated by the sudden and

disorderly arrival on the beaches of
Florida of 125,000 people, a significant
percentage of whom proved difficult to
resettle. Concerns about the criminal

element within the Mariel cohort cer-

officials, was that the freedom flights

tainly played a major role, as did the
well-publicized rioting at resettlement
camps in Arkansas and Wisconsin.
By 1980, moreover, the implicit rationale for regarding every Cuban mi-

furthered U.S. foreign policy objectives.

grant as a refugee had largely evaporated.

THE POLITICS OF

not only the immediate sense that Mariel

THWARTED NORMALIZATION:

was a direct result of Castro's hostility
toward the United States, but also a
long-germinating realization that the

to the Cuban government. But the con-

temporary view, expressed frequently

by politicians and State Department

Responsible for that evaporation was

1974-80

Between the end of the freedom flights

in April 1973 and the beginning of the
1980 Mariel boatlift, a seven-year period
intervened during which Cuban migra-

tion to the United States was limited to a

few thousand Cuban political prisoners,

Cuban spouses and children accompanying Americans who had been previously

denied exit visas, approximately 17,000
tary of State Rusk, "U.S. Position on Special
Food Project in Cuba," 13 Feb. 1963, State
Department Bulletin, 48(1237):357 (11 Mar. 1963).
49. For more than a year before the end of the
freedom flights, it had been reported that Cuba
might end them because of the economic effect of
losing its professional class. See New York Times,
6 Dec. 1971, p. 25.

Cubans who arrived here could no longer
be used to make any further exemplary

points about either the horrors of life
under Castro or the more general failures of the communist system. That realization had its roots in a gradual redefinition of U.S.-Cuban relations that began
while the freedom flights were still under
way. The failure of this redefinition of
50. Typical of early coverage was a story
describing asylum-seeking Cubans in their "voyage
to freedom," "Sea Lift from Cuba to Key West,"

Newsweek, 5 May 1980, p. 59. Two weeks later,
the press was emphasizing "the rapidly growing

backlash." "The Cuban Tide Is a Flood," Newsweek, 19 May 1980, p. 29.
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relations to achieve long-awaited nor-

Cuba and pushing it ever more deeply

malization was probably the chief factor

in Castro's unleashing of the Mariel

into the Eastern bloc, yet producing no
significant liberalization in Cuba and no

flow.

counterrevolutionary movement there.

By the early 1970s, there was concern
growing in Congress that Cuban migration had lost its original political charac-

ter, that it was bringing to the United
States larger numbers of people less easily assimilable to the domestic labor
market and more dependent on welfare
aid, and that the money spent on the
airlift and related resettlement programs

might better be spent on the indigenous

poor.5' Although the Department of
State continued to insist that the free-

dom flights were a demonstration of the

bankruptcy of the Cuban system, the
ideological argument for admitting Cu-

bans as refugees had lost some of its
force. That argument continued to decline in importance as, in succeeding
years, initiatives and attitudinal changes
toward Cuba and the communist bloc

that first emerged in the late 1960s con-

tinued to develop.
Among these developments were the

evolution of more pragmatic and less
ideological ways of managing the EastWest conflict; a new perception of Cuba
as a nuisance rather than as an overt

threat to hemispheric peace; a growing
realization that the policy of economically and politically isolating Cuba was
no longer a practical option, given the
unwillingness of traditional allies to
continue to cooperate; and a concomitant understanding that past policy had
in any event failed, creating hardship in
51. In June 1971, the Appropriations Committee of the U.S. Senate voted to cut off funds for
the airlift because it believed the continuing influx
was adding to U.S. welfare rolls. New York Times,

26 June 1971, p. 26. Similar attempts to cut off
airlift funds to aid U.S. urban poor occurred in
1970. See New York Times, 10 July 1970, p. 4.

DETENTE

The retreat from unrelieved hostility
in U.S.-Cuban relations took place within

the context of the Nixon-Kissinger attempt to reach a more constructive rela-

tionship with the Soviet Union and
China, America's two principal adversaries. Instead of superpower relations
based on total enmity, the Nixon admin-

istration sought to involve Russia and
China in the establishment of a new

power balance that would reduce tension and the risks of war.52 Kissinger
wanted to avoid the ideological moralism that had characterized American

foreign policy during the cold war.53 He
avoided criticisms of internal Soviet or

Chinese policy, believing that such
demands were likely to be counterproductive and would threaten detente,
jeopardize the delicate balance of arms
control negotiations, and reintroduce
the cold war.

This new approach to East-West relations at least indirectly affected CubanAmerican relations. For if the IJnited
States was prepared to negotiate its differences with the Soviet Union and to

52. Henry Kissinger, "The Process of Detente"
(Statement delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 Sept. 1974), in his American
Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 1977),
pp. 144-45.

53. See Interview with Pierre Salinger, L'Express, News Release, 12 Apr. 1975, Bureau of Public

Affairs, Office of Media Services, Department
of State; and Henry Kissinger, "Moral Purposes
and Policy Choices," Department of State Bulletin,

69: 525 (1973).
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pursue the possibility of trade and diplomatic relations with China, which it had

Cuban relations with other nations in
Latin America became more concilia-

traditionally labeled as perhaps the most
totalitarian regime in the world and as a

tory. By 1970, the only condition being

stressed by the Cuban government for

direct military threat to its allies and

relations with Cuba-that countries

strategic interests, the rationale for con-

behave independently of the U.S. hemispheric security-grew increasingly uncon-

tinuing to isolate Cuba largely evaporated. As Secretary of State William
Rogers noted in an address before the

General Assembly of the OAS three

vincing as a reason for isolating Cuba.
THE FAILURE OF ISOLATION

months after the China visit, "the very
boldness of President Nixon's initiatives

Cuba's new foreign policy contrib-

toward China has raised questions whe-

uted to the failure of a U.S.-dominated

ther we might not be on the verge of a
shift, with similar surprise, in our atti-

strategy of isolation by reopening diplomatic and trade channels to other coun-

tude toward Cuba."54

tries in the hemisphere and by providing

additional encouragement to Western
REDUCED CUBAN THREAT

Further contributing to the dissipa-

tion of that rationale was a subtle rechar-

acterization of the Castro regime which

began in 1967, when Ernesto Che Guevara was killed in Bolivia and his guer-

European nations to resume or augment
their commerce with Cuba. By the early

1970s, Cuba had greatly expanded its
international contacts. Favorable govern-

ments had come to power in Chile,
Argentina, Peru, and Panama and were

willing to join Mexico in renouncing

rilla movement there wiped out. As

sanctions. Other Latin American nations,

Johnson's adviser on Latin American

anxious to increase trade with Cuba.

early as 1968, Sol Linowitz, President
affairs, had reported that there was no

massive guerrilla threat to hemispheric
security.55 At that time, the Soviet Union

was also applying considerable pressure

on the Castro regime to abandon its
attempts to export revolution. As a

result, there occurred a fundamental
shift in Cuban foreign policy.56 Although
Castro did not renounce his ideas on

revolution, he began to stress the need
for internal development and peaceful
relations with progressive governments.
54. William Rogers, Statement of 12 Apr.
1972, Department of State Bulletin, 66(1714): 621
(1 May, 1972).
55. New York Times, 28 Feb. 1968, p. 10.
56. Jorge Dominguez, "Cuban Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, 57(1):83-108 (Fall 1978),
esp. pp. 59-91.

such as Venezuela and Ecuador, were
Newly independent English-speaking

countries in the Caribbean that were

admitted to the OAS had had no part in
the blockade of Cuba and maintained

friendly relations. A new trade accord
was also reached with Mexico, and
commerce with Japan, Canada, and the
Western European countries rose dramatically.
PRESSURE FOR A
NEW CUBAN POLICY

Responding to these developments,
Congress and various interest groups

within and without the United States

began urging a new U.S. policy toward
Cuba well in advance of the termination

of the freedom flights in 1973. As early

as the 1968 presidential campaign,

This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 29 Apr 2016 15:23:23 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

130

Hubert Humphrey had suggested that
the OAS reexamine its sanctions.57 In

1969, Senator Mansfield, an early advocate of the U.S. boycott, spoke in favor
of entering into a hijacking treaty with

a U.S. volleyball team to Cuba in 1971
and the initiation-immediately after
the 1972 election-of skyjacking talks
with Cuba. The Cuban plank of the 1972

Cuba, and of improving U.S.-Cuban

Democratic platform was considerably
more moderate, stating that the "time

relations.58 Similar positions were adopted by other members of the Senate For-

with Cuba and to seek a way to resolve

eign Relations Committee. Similarly the

this cold war confrontation on mutually

New York Times in 1971 adopted a new

acceptable terms."61 The quest for such
"mutually acceptable terms" began soon
after President Ford entered office in

editorial policy urging normalization,59
and a number of mainline church groups,

has come to reexamine our relations

including the Roman Catholic Bishops

1974 and continued under President

of Cuba, the United Presbyterian Church,

Carter until early 1978, although new

and the World Council of Churches,
advocated the end of Cuba's "continen-

U.S.-Cuban tensions erupted in late
1977.

tal excommunication."60 There were also

indications from various members of

NORMALIZATION, MIGRATION,

the U.S. business community that they
would welcome steps toward resump-

tion of commercial relations.

Thus a full-fledged debate on U.S.
policy toward Cuba was already under
way in the early 1970s when Senate hear-

ings were held reviewing that policy.
That debate continued through the 1972

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Implicit in U.S. responses to Cuban
migration prior to the era of attempted
normalization of relations was a view of

human rights similar to that espoused
later and more explicitly by Ernest
Lefever and Jeane Kirkpatrick.62 Thus

presidential campaign, with the Nixon
administration remaining quite adament

about Cuba, although permitting such
small accommodations as the journey of
57. Hubert Humphrey, Interview with editors
of the New York Times, New York Times 23 June
1968, p. 58. However, by October 1968, Vice-President

Humphrey was taking a considerably harder line.

See New York Times, 20 Oct. 1968, p. 74.
58. See New York Times, 2 Feb. 1969, p. 48;
and New York Times, 9 Dec. 1969, p. 4.
59. In October 1971, the New York Times

61. Sobel, ed. Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, p.
46.

62. In an op-ed piece commenting on the
emerging Carter position, "The Rights Standard,"
LeFever argued that human rights policy should
be subordinate to the national interest more

broadly defined. He asserted it was in the national

interest to continue supporting an "authoritarian
ally," Chile, but not to improve relations with a
"totalitarian adversary," Cuba, which maintained
a military presence in Africa and held "thousands

of political prisoners and denied many basic
rights." New York Times, 24 Jan. 1977, p. 23.

advocated for the first time that the United States

Jeane Kirkpatrick has elaborated on the authori-

normalize its relations with Cuba. New York

tarian/ totalitarian distinction. See "Human Rights

Times, 29 Oct. 1971, p. 40.

and American Foreign Policy: A Symposium,"

60. Archbishop Camara, speaking on behalf
of the Roman Catholic Bishops of Cuba, New

Commentary, Nov. 1981, pp. 42-45. In June 1982,

York Times, 27 Jan. 1969, p. 2. Pronormalization

Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of state for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in a

statements issued by the other named groups were

speech delivered in Miami, relied implicitly on the

reported by the New York Times, 25 May 1969, p.
40, and 21 Aug. 1969, p. 7.

authoritarian/totalitarian distinction to explain
why Cubans are refugees and should continue to
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life in Cuba was regarded automatically
as the equivalent of persecution, and
those fleeing as refugees.63 During the
era of attempted normalization, considerably less attention was given to the
hardships of life in Cuba. Particularly
during President Ford's administration,
when migration from Cuba was almost
nonexistent, little attempt was made to

ican reappraisal of relations with Cuba
and a search for possible areas of accommodation.

During this period, minor steps were

taken to lessen hostilities. In February
1973, the governments of the United
States and Cuba signed an antihijacking
agreement. An important provision of
the agreement stipulated that each coun-

relate current conditions there to the

try would try to punish, according to its

generation of refugee flow.
This is not to suggest that either President Ford or his State Department said

law, persons who conspired to promote,

many positive things about the Castro

or vessels traveling to or from the territory of the other country or other sim-

regime. Rather the policy, at least through

late 1975, was to say very little publicly

prepare, direct, or participate in any
expedition aimed at damaging aircraft

while conducting secretive but not

ilar unlawful acts.64 In a major policy
shift, the United States voted with the

entirely unnoticed normalization nego-

new majority which, in July 1975, ended

tiations. This was consistent with Secre-

tary of State Kissinger's view that relations with foreign governments, and not
the internal affairs of foreign countries,
were the legitimate concern of the U.S.
government. The changes that were tak-

ing place in Cuba's relations with other
governments and the generally changing
pattern of world politics led to an Amerbe welcome in the United States-at least to the

extent they are not "shot" at the United States "in

the way a cannonball is shot out of a cannon,"

while Haitians should be turned away at the
border or interdicted at sea. "Human Rights and
the Refugee Crisis," 2 June 1982, Department of

State Bulletin, 82(2066):43-45, 44 (Sept. 1982).
63. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration

the OAS policy of hemispheric sanctions. President Ford, Secretary of State

Kissinger, and a number of other State
Department officials all made public
statements favoring dialogue with Cuba
with the object of eventually normalizing relations.
However, two aspects of Cuban foreign policy were consistently criticized:
its growing military involvement in

Angola and its support in the U.N.

Decolonization Committee for Puerto

Rican independence. Moreover Secretary Kissinger, in a comment in connection with the lifting of the OAS embargo

on Cuba, had specified that the U.S.

and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 essentially

decision on whether to resume relations

defined a refugee as a person fleeing persecution in

with Cuba would be "heavily influenced

a communist-dominated or Middle Eastern coun-

try. INA, sec. 203(a) (7), 8 USC 1153(a) (7) (1965)
(repealed). Most Cubans were not admitted under

by the external policies of the Cuban
government," especially in connection

the direct authority of these amendments, although
they did receive favorable immigration treatment.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, almost
without exception, Cubans prior to the summer of

1980 were not required by the Immigration Service to show any personal opposition to the Castro
regime or any personal hardship exacted as a price
for particular associations or political beliefs.

64. Agreement on the Hijacking of Aircraft
and Vessels and Other Offenses (15 Feb. 1973),
TIAS 7575, UNTS, 24:737. This was the first
agreement to limit the use of the United States as a

base for terrorist exile groups against Cuba and
received virtually no publicity in the United States.
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with its "military relationship with countries outside the hemisphere."65

Increasing concern over Cuba's African role, as well as the exigencies of the

primary campaign for the 1976 presidential race, resulted in an abrupt U.S.
policy shift in late 1975 and early 1976.
In November 1975, shortly after Castro
sent 4000 Cuban troops to aid the forces
of the Popular Movement for the Liber-

ation of Angola, negotiations between
Cuban and U.S. diplomats broke off; in
December, President Ford announced
that the "action of the Cuban govern-

ment in sending combat forces into
Angola destroys any opportunity for
improvement of relations with Cuba. "66

In February of the following yearfive days before the Florida primarythe president assumed his most forceful

anti-Castro stance. In that speech, delivered at a ceremony in Miami in which
some 1200 immigrants, including a large

number of Cubans, became naturalized
American citizens, he not only labeled
the Castro regime "a regime of aggression"67 and pledged total U.S. noncooperation with it, but also resorted for perhaps the only time in his administration

to the traditional cold war refugee rhe-

toric with respect to Cubans. Thus he
told his audience,
You can tell those who take America for
granted that millions of people in other lands

as far away as 9,000 miles and as close as 90

65. Quoted in Jan Knippers Black et al., Area

Handbook for Cuba (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 345.
66. "President's News Conference of December

20, 1975," in Public Papers of the Presidents:
Gerald Ford, 1975 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), vol. 2, p. 1987.

67. Public Papers of the Presidents: Gerald
Ford, 1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), vol. 1, p. 464.

miles would dearly love to have just a fraction of freedom we have in America.
Many of you come from places where people
are denied the right of free choice; from pla-

ces where churches and synagogues are open,
but only for tourists; from places where free
elections are promised, but never held; from

places where free speech exists only as a
memory.68

In the same speech, President Ford also
pledged to support legislation speeding
the naturalization of Cuban refugees.
The more overt normalization drive

that occurred when Jimmy Carter became

president in January 1977 followed much

the same pattern, with numerous public
statements supporting eventual resumption of diplomatic relations, criticism of

the Castro regime focused generally on
its foreign rather than its domestic policy, and no recourse, even indirectly, to
the metaphor of people voting with their

feet until late in the president's term,
when the campaign for renomination
and reelection was already under way.
Nonetheless the Carter administration,
because of its more specific emphasis on
human rights and because of some of the
advances it did make in improving rela-

tions with Cuba, developed a more
comprehensive immigration policy

toward Cuba than did its predecessors,
although that policy was hardly free

from contradiction.

The step-by-step advances in CubanAmerican relations in 1977 and the sub-

sequent retreat in 1978 and 1979 have
been sufficiently well documented elsewhere.69 However, several lines of devel68. Ibid.

69. Among the better. accounts of Cuban-

American relations 1977-80 are Alfred Stepan,

"The United States and Latin America: Vital

Interests and the Instruments of Power," Foreign
Affairs, America and the World-1979, 58(3):659-
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opment that directly affected the flow of
Cubans to the United States from the

contact. As important, they had a limited

autumn of 1978 on and that helped color
the official and unofficial perception of

visas. Movement in both directions was

the Mariel boatlift deserve some atten-

interest section in Washington, the lapse
of a regulation prohibiting the travel of
U.S. citizens to Cuba, and the U.S.

tion. These developments involved the
partial but short-lived opening of ordinary migration channels, the reversal of

capacity to issue travel documents and

thus facilitated. The opening of the

the political prisoner issue, the instru-

Treasury's legalization of expenditures
in Cuba by visitors from the United

mental role that contacts between Cuban

States set the stage for short-term visits

exiles and the Castro regime played in

to Cuba by Cuban exiles and others.
These were made initially by members

renewing Cuban migration, the political
use that Castro was able to make of the

boatlift, and the Carter administration's
own indecisiveness about how to char-

acterize or treat the Cubans seeking
admission.

All of these factors were closely re-

of the Cuban community in Miami who
favored dialogue with Castro. However,
in November 1978-at a time when

U.S.-Cuban relations had soured again,
due to widespread Cuban military involvement in Africa-Castro announced that

lated. The culmination of the 1977 Cuban

beginning in January 1979, he would

thaw was the opening, on 1 September

accept visits from all Cuban exiles.70

of that year, of interest sections by the

During 1979, some 100,000 Cuban
Americans accepted this invitation.

United States and Cuba in Havana and

Washington, respectively. Staffed by
mid-level diplomats, they provided a
channel for continuing direct bilateral
92, 685-91; William M. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy
Recycled," Foreign Policy, 46:105-19 (Spring 1982);

and Wayne S. Smith, "Dateline Havana: Myopic
Policy," Foreign Policy, 48:157-74 (Fall 1982).
Also informative are Barry Sklar, Cuban Exodus-

1980, the Context, mimeo (Washington, DC:
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1980); and the report of the Special Congres-

sional Study Mission to Cuba, Toward Improved
U.S.-Cuba Relations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), which contains an
especially helpful chronology as an appendix. For
treatment of events leading up to the Mariel boatlift, see Mario A. Rivera, "The Cuban and Haitian

Influxes of 1980 and the American Response: Ret-

rospect and Prospect," U.S. House of Representa-

It is important to note that these trips
to Cuba began well before there was any

significant flow in the opposite direction. When renewed Cuban migration
to the United States began, first as the
result of a Castro-initiated political prisoner release program and later as a

consequence of the Peruvian embassy
occupation and the subsequent Mariel
boatlift, much of its impetus could be
traced back to the visits to Cuba by
exiles. Similarly much of the Carter
administration's ambivalence toward
that flow when it began can be traced to
its uncertainty about the exile role, both
at the time of these visits and afterward.

The political prisoner release pro-

tives Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight Hear-

gram and the Carter administration's

ings: Caribbean Migration (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1980), appendix 4;
and Ronald Copeland, "The Cuban Boatlift of
1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, 467 (May 1983).

response to it in large measure set the
tone for the administration's later
response to Mariel. At the 1976 nomi70. New York Times, 22 Nov. 1978, p. 2.
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nating convention, the Democrats tied

ber, in the same speech that initiated the

betterment of U.S.-Cuban relations to

large-scale visitation program, Castro
announced his intention of releasing
some 3000 political prisoners and 600
other Cubans imprisoned for minor
crimes at the rate of 400 prisoners per

two issues: lessening of Cuban involvement in Africa and release of political
prisoners in Cuba.71 In response to fre-

quent questions after his election about
his human rights policy vis-a-vis Cuba,
President Carter's stock response was
that the United States was seeking, as a
condition or prerequisite for normalization, "a demonstration of [the Cuban
leadersl commitment to the human rights

concept, particularly by releasing some
of the thousands of political prisoners
they have had incarcerated for a number
of years, 15 or 20 years.t72 Although the

political prisoner question was the only
specific human rights issue President
Carter was to raise publicly about Cuba
until the last year of his term, he received

no positive response from Castro during
the 1977 thaw.

month.74

Instead of responding to the prisoner

release program with enthusiasm, as
might have been expected, the Carter
administration responded with suspicion,

largely because progress on the human
rights front was not matched by any
change in Cuba's foreign policy. Processing of political prisoner immigration applications lagged far behind the
number of applicants. Despite Castro's
demand that the United States accept all
those released who indicated a desire to

resettle there, Attorney General Griffin
Bell continued personally to review each
file, with the stated purpose of excluding

months after Carter had lashed out at

"spies, terrorists, and common criminals."75 Castro, in turn, announced his

Cuba for its alleged involvement in the

willingness to meet with exile represen-

However, on 1 September 1978, three

Angolan invasion of Zaire, Castro announced a change of heart: he would
release 500-1000 political prisoners into
the custody of the United States. In
October, Castro met with a visiting
delegation of exiles, the Committee of
75. Following that meeting, Castro announced that he agreed with the committee in principle that more political
prisoners should be released, that there
should be more family reunification and
more travel to Cuba.73 Finally in Novem159.

tatives again to discuss how releases to
the United States could be effectuated
should the Carter administration refuse

to accept them.76

Although President Carter shortly
thereafter pledged to do his "utmost to

ease the plight ... of released political
prisoners" and expressed his "hope that

we will always stand ready to welcome
more than our fair share of those who

flee their homelands because of racial,
economic, or religious oppression,"77 and

71. Sobel, ed., Castro's Cuba in the 1970's, p.

74. New York Times, 22 Nov. 1978, p. 2.

72. Interview with the President, and Ques-

correcting account of 19 Nov. 1975 remarks.

tion and Answer Session with a group of Publish-

ers, Editors, and Broadcasters, 20 May 1977, in
Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter,
1977 (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office), vol. 1, p. 946.

73. New York Times, 24 Oct. 1978, p. 13.

75. New York Times, 25 Nov. 1978, p. 25,

76. "Castro Would Free 3000," New York
Times, 23 Nov. 1978, p. 7.
77. "Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"
Remarks by President Carter, 6 Dec. 1978, Weekly

Compilation of Presidential Documents,
14(49):2163 (11 Dec. 1978).
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although the pace of admissions did
increase, the political prisoner release
program, as a unilateral Castro initia-
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sympathy for his regime from the group
most vocally and violently opposed to it,

he apparently failed. Instead the group

tive, was never enthusiastically embraced

most influenced were Cubans who had

by the United States. Indeed hundreds
of former political prisoners were still

wealth and the well-being of their main-

seeking entry when the 1980 influx began,
and the issue had become a source of

contact with long-departed friends and

acute Cuban grievance against the Uni-

never left and were impressed by the

land visitors, as well as by renewal of
relatives.

ted States.

The visitation program highlighted

From the U.S. perspective, Cuba's
external policies, its alignment with the
Soviet Union, and its activities in Africa
were of central concern and overrode in

importance Castro's concessions on the
political prisoner issue. Moreover during 1979, new U.S. concerns subsequently

arose, such as Cuba's increasingly close
military relationship with the Soviet
Union and Cuba's growing willingness

to become involved in the Caribbean

and Central America. In response, the

not only the attractiveness of the United

States, but also "the sea of difficulties,"79 economic and political, in which
Cuba continued to swim. Cuba in 1979

and 1980, plagued by its overdependence on an unsatisfactory and underpriced sugar crop, had entered into a
new era of hardships. Accompanying
this deprivation were new political cam-

paigns launched against the nation's
nonproductive and undesirable citizens,

including its homosexuals and petty

Carter administration in 1979 decided

criminals. The visits by Cuban Ameri-

to switch from a policy toward Cuba

cans did not create the dissatisfaction
with conditions in Cuba that was then

based on efforts to normalize relations
to a concerted effort to discourage Cuba's

involvement in the region. Presidential
Directive 52 called for increased eco-

endemic, but they did serve as a catalyst
by emphasizing the attractiveness of the
migration alternative.

nomic aid and sales of military equip-

When Castro, on 4 April 1980, opened

ment to allied governments in the region,
and the U.S. took a series of additional

the gates of the Peruvian embassy to
more than 10,000 Cubans seeking to
leave their country, the United States

steps, including renewal of spy-plane
flights, the establishment by the United

was confronted with that alternative

States of a Joint Caribbean Task Force,
and military maneuvers at the Guanta-

and the necessity of responding to it. A

namo naval base.78

The 1980 influx not only took place

further response was required on 19
April when Castro opened Mariel Harbor and in the months thereafter when

in the context of a rapidly deteriorating

the Marielitos continued to arrive in

bilateral relationship but was, at the

Florida. Under those policies that had
prevailed in 1959-62 and 1965-73, the
U.S. response in each instance would

very least, also hastened by the extensive

visitation of large numbers of Cuban
Americans to Cuba in 1979. If Castro

intended those visits to generate more
78. Sklar, Cuban Exodus, p. 28.

79. The phrase is from a speech made by Fidel

Castro in December 1979. It is quoted and analyzed in Rivera, "Cuban and Haitian Influxes," p.

291.
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have been unreservedly positive, al-

Had Carter been able to exploit the

though attempts to secure an orderly
departure program might have ensued.
By 1980, however, a decade of pronor-

1980 flow and to argue forcefully, consistently, and often that the Marielitos
were in fact voting with their feet, that
their motivations were primarily political rather than economic, that the "dregs
of Cuban society" made up only a small
and manageable part of the 1980 refugee
cohort, then the gap between these con-

malization arguments and initiatives had
robbed a new and massive Cuban immi-

gration program of its ideological appeal.

Caught in a new and more complex
calculus of response, the Carter administration found itself weighing a variety
of reasons for welcoming Cubans warmly

or discouraging their entry. Favoring
generosity were a well-publicized human
rights policy, a campaign to win the electoral support of the large Cuban-Ameri-

can community in Florida, and the
attacks of candidate Ronald Reagan,
"who blasted Carter's efforts to bar

refugees."80 Favoring restriction were a

new refugee act-which permitted the

flicting objectives might have been
bridged, and some of the negative effect
of the flotilla's ungoverned arrival mitigated. However, despite a January 1980
State Department Human Rights report
highly critical of the "totalitarian Marxist-

Leninist system" in Cuba and its effect
on the Cuban people,81 despite remarks
by President Carter just days before the

boatlift began comparing Cuba to East
Berlin as a place desperate to keep its

admission of large numbers of refugees
but required that they demonstrate fear
of persecution as their motive for depar-

dissenters in,82 and despite Vice-President

ture-growing national concern over

effort to turn the 1980 exodus into an

uncontrolled immigration, and a sense
that Castro was exploiting the migra-

asset rather than a liability occurred.
Instead, the first decision reached for

Mondale's early effort to make political

capital out of the influx, no consistent

tion fever to export Cubans deemed, not

those occupying the Peruvian embassy

only by Cuba but also by the United

was that they would be admitted to the

States, undesirable. By forcing boat

United States only if they met U.S.

skippers to carry several thousand institutionalized persons to the United States

immigration requirements or entered

and by actively involving the Cuban
government in the direction of traffic
into and out of Mariel, Castro magni-

the political prisoner program.83 On 15
April President Carter invoked his powers under the new refugee act to designate 3500 of the Cubans in the Peruvian

fied this concern. Deteriorating relations

with Congress over Cuba, occasioned
largely by the Carter administration's
indecisive response to the Soviet combat

brigade originally believed stationed
there, required that Carter take a hard
line with Castro, yet President Carter's
own rhetoric required that genuine
refugees be received warmly.
80. LeoGrande, "Cuba Policy Recycled," p.
111.

81. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports

on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Offices, 1980), pp.

291-97.

82. Speech before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, 10 Apr. 1980, in Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1981), vol. 1, p. 642.
83. New York Times, 6 Apr. 1980, p. 4.
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embassy as refugees admissible to the
United States.84

Yet no similar action was taken later
with the throng waiting to leave Mariel85
or with those who had landed in Florida. Instead during the first weeks of the
boatlift, the Carter administration welcomed with one hand while it waved the

boats away with the other. Carter's
"open heart and open arms"86 speech
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Department maintained a consistent per-

spective. Its opposition to the boatlift
marked a new recognition that in mass-

asylum situations in this hemisphere,
particularly those involving Cuba, it is
no longer possible to rely on cold war
ideology and label all who leave as refugees without first examining their economic situation and their true motives
for departure.

followed by three days a White House
statement that the INS was concerned

about criminals in the flotilla and would

CONCLUSION

actively interfering with boat traffic head-

To date, the lessons of Mariel have
been almost exclusively negative. Cubans, who for foreign policy reasons

ing to pick up passengers from Cuba,

were automatically classified as refugees

carefully screen each arrival.87 Until 15

May, when the Coast Guard began

threats of reprisals against boat owners

alternated with Coast Guard sailing

instructions on how best to make the

round trip from Mariel.88 Only the State

in the past, are unlikely to be granted
especially favorable immigration treatment so long as they are regarded, in the
words of former White House Assistant

Jack Watson, "as bullets aimed at this
country."89 As Elliot Abrams's June
1982 speech confirms,90 the Reagan admin-

84. "Cuban Refugees in the Peruvian Embassy

istration is likely to regard any new

in Havana," White House Statement, 14 Apr.

Cuban influx in terms of this metaphor.

1980, in Public Papers of the Presidents, Jimmy
Carter, 1980-81, vol. 1, p. 682.
85. Senator Kennedy urged such a use of the
Refugee Act in a public letter to the president on

But as that speech also confirms, the
traditional view of Cubans voting with

20 May 1980. See Congressional Record, 6 June
1980, S.6436-37.

86. "League of Women Voters," Remarks and
a Question-and-Answer Session, 5 May 1980, in
Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter,
1980-81, vol. 1, pp. 833-34.
87. "Cuban Refugees, White House Announcement of Federal Actions in Response to the Emergency," 2 May 1980, ibid., vol. 1, p. 819.
88. In the weeks before President Carter an-

nounced his intention of using the Coast Guard to
stop the boat traffic from Mariel Harbor, it had

been used for precisely the opposite purpose.
According to one newspaper account, "As thousands of Cubans continue to express abhorrence

their feet appeals to the administration's
strong anticommunist, anti-Castro sen-

timents. The policy dilemma posed by
any renewal of significant Cuban flow
appears insoluble, unless refugee admis-

sions-and particularly the asylum procedures that will govern the admission
of future Cuban boat people-are substantially depoliticized.
biggest peacetime operations it has ever mounted."

"Coast Guard Shepherding Cubans from Danger

to Succor: Small Boat Armada Depends on

'Mothering' by Cutters," Christian Science Monitor, 8 May 1980.

of Fidel Castro's rule of their homeland by stream-

ing away from it in anything that can float, the
U.S. Coast Guard is laboring mightily to ensure
their safe arrival on these shores in one of the

292.

89. Rivera, "Cuban and Haitian Influxes," p.
90. Abrams, "Human Rights and the Refugee

Crisis."
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